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PRELIMINARY DRAFT
Abstract. This paper examines the empirical validity of the Mayer-Heckscher-Ohlin (M-H-O) model.
We test the inequality-tariff relationship studied by Dutt & Mitra (2002) as well as a large country version
of Mayer’s model. Dutt and Mitra (2002) found support for the inequality-tariff implication of the model
for a cross-section of countries in the 1980s, using physical capital and labor as the two factors in the M-
H-O model. Our results suggest that this finding is not robust. Instead, we find that when human capital
and (unskilled) labor are taken as relevant factors, the Mayer implication is validated in the 1980s. Using
cross-sectional country data, we also find that the Mayer implication holds for the 1990s with either physical
capital or human capital. We discuss possible explanations for the different findings in the two periods.
We extend the model to a large country and obtain tariff levels which are a function of the median voter
component and a terms of trade factor. For the 1990s, the positive impact of terms of trade considerations on
tariff levels across countries is validated. Using human capital, we find that the median voter component has
a negative impact on tariffs in labor-abundant countries and a positive impact in capital-abundant countries.
Acknowledgement. We are grateful to Bob Staiger for reviewing the draft and for several helpful comments.
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Re-examination of the Mayer Median Voter Model of Trade Policy
1. Introduction
“If, by an overwhelming consensus among economists, trade should be free, then why is it
that nearly everywhere we look, and however far back, trade is in chains?”
Gawande & Krishna (2005)
For decades, theorists have been putting forward ideas to explain the existence of protectionism, leading
to a large body of theories that endogenize trade policy.1 Two major categories are special interest group
theories and the direct democracy approach. The former has been empirically examined by Goldberg &
Maggi (1999) and Gawande & Bandyopadhyay (2000) in a small country setup and by Gawande & Li (2005)
in a large country setup. Within the direct democracy category, an implication of the Mayer median voter
theory of trade policy (Mayer, 1984) has been empirically tested by Dutt & Mitra (2002) for the 1980s.
Their findings are consistent with the model. This paper re-examines the empirical validity of the Mayer
hypotheses with data from the 1980s as well as the 1990s. We test the inequality-tariff relationship studied
by Dutt & Mitra (2002) as well as a large country version of Mayer’s model.
The Mayer hypothesis asserts that “each factor owner has an optimal tariff whose value is uniquely related
to the individual’s factor ownership. In the special case of majority voting with no voting costs, it is the
median factor owner’s optimal tariff rate that will be chosen to become the actual tariff rate” (Mayer, 1984,
pp. 971). Since the median voter owns a small share of aggregate capital in the country, this yields a level
of tariff prediction for her country. In the Mayer-Heckscher-Ohlin (M-H-O) setting, the optimal tariff is
negative for a labor-abundant country and positive for a capital-abundant country.
Several papers have examined the validity of the tariff-factor ownership link and found support for it
as well as the Stolper-Samuelson effect which drives the predictions of the Mayer model. Balistreri (1997)
finds support for HOV in the voting preferences of Canadians regarding Canadian-US Free Trade Agreement
(1989). Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Mayda and Rodrik (2005) and O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001) use survey
data to confirm that individual preferences over trade policy depend on factor ownership.
Beaulieu and Magee (2004) use Political Action Committee (PAC) contribution data and find that the
factor represented by the PAC is more important than industry in determining support for NAFTA and
GATT in the US. This is consistent with the M-H-O model in that “capital groups consistently back repre-
sentatives supporting trade liberalization while labor groups favor protectionists” (pp. 163). So, at a more
aggregate level than individual data, there is some evidence which supports the level prediction that capital
owners favor tariff reductions and vice-versa. But, when we consider trade policies across countries, we rarely
observe a “pro-trade” bias.2 Thus, Mayer’s level of tariff prediction seems unrealistic. However, the model
can be salvaged by two key extensions.
The first extension was proposed by Dutt and Mitra (2002). Leaving the level prediction aside, they
examined a comparative static result that follows from the M-H-O framework. Mayer’s model predicts that
higher inequality in factor ownership would cause tariff rates to rise in capital-rich countries and to fall in
capital-scarce ones. Dutt and Mitra (DM hereafter) tested this variation in tariffs prediction using data from
the 1980s. They found evidence of the tariff-inequality relationship. Their empirical results are important
not only because they provide some “tentative”3 support for the median voter model, but also because the
tariff-inequality relationship does not have a clear theoretical answer.
Mayer’s precise implication for tariffs and inequality is in contrast to other political economy models of
trade policy. In particular, DM explain that when a lobbying approach is used in a similar two-sector two-
factor constant returns to scale setup such as Rodrik (1986), the opposite prediction follows. An increase
in capital inequality results in lower protection in capital-rich countries and vice-versa. On the other hand,
when a lobbying model with specific factors is used, there are no clear cross-country predictions since the
impact of an increase in inequality on trade barriers is highly sensitive to the costs of forming lobbies in
each country (Feenstra (2003), pp. 311-15). The relationship between inequality and tariff levels is an
empirical question that can also shed light on the appropriateness of alternative theoretical models. Viewed
1See Gawande & Krishna (2005) for a survey of the literature on political economy of trade policy.
2Dutt and Mitra (2002), pp. 109.
3Gawande & Krishna (2005), pp. 11.
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in this context, Feenstra comments that DM’s finding of a “systematic” relationship between inequality and
protection is even more “remarkable” ( Feenstra (2003), pp. 314).
We use DM’s approach of examining the variation prediction and extend their analysis to the 1990s. Our
time period covers the liberalization of several countries (at least 13, which includes some major developing
countries) (Greenaway et al, 1997). Further, we use new measures of trade restrictiveness following Anderson
and Neary (2003). Our results reveal an interesting difference - in the 1980s, the Mayer implication does
not find strong empirical support when it is tested for physical capital and unskilled labor but, it cannot be
rejected when we compare skilled labor with unskilled labor. In the 1990s however, the Mayer implication
cannot be rejected when either physical capital or human capital is used.
The relevance of human capital is consistent with previous empirical work on the median voter theory of
trade policy. Other than DM, all the papers mentioned earlier compare trade preferences of unskilled versus
skilled labor rather than physical capital. Thus, they corroborate our finding regarding suitability of human
capital as the second factor in Mayer’s framework.4 But, they use a direct micro-level approach to explore
the trade preference-factor ownership link. We are interested in finding out whether the preference of the
median voter actually manifests itself in the form of her country’s adopted trade policy, so we use DM’s
approach.
The results from DM’s variation method lend support to the M-H-O model. So, we can take the next step
by addressing the level prediction. The key question that we ask is - how can Mayer’s import subsidization
result be reconciled with the lack of “pro-trade” bias across countries? To answer this, we extend the model to
the case of a large country. In the M-H-O setting, the optimal tariff for a large country has two components
- the Mayer median voter component and a terms of trade component. Thus, if a large labor-abundant
country has sufficient market power, then the positive terms of trade component dominates the negative
median voter component and the optimal tariff is positive. Hence, this simple extension overcomes the
import subsidization result for large labor-abundant countries.
We extend the model to a large country framework because it is more appropriate for addressing tariff-
setting issues. Previous work on tariff levels has found evidence that even countries with very small shares in
world GDP have the ability to influence their terms of trade. So, an overwhelming number of countries can
actually be considered “large” implying that terms of trade considerations play a decisive role in tariff-setting.
Broda et al (2006) find that countries with higher market power set higher tariffs, at both the aggregate
and disaggregate levels. Similarly, Olarreaga et al (1999) find that terms of trade considerations account for
about 6 to 28 per cent of the explained variation in tariffs across commodities for MERCOSUR countries
even though MERCOSUR share in world imports is just one per cent. However, both papers include a
commodity-level analysis of tariffs so the chosen political economy variables are those implied by special
interest group theories. Our paper considers a general interest large country model, instead.
In a large country framework, trade agreements that conform to reciprocity can increase welfare levels of
each participating country via reciprocal trade liberalization (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999). Our time period
covers the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). So, we expect WTO members to engage in a
mutual re-adjustment of their tariffs. We incorporate this insight into our empirical framework by controlling
for membership status while testing the extended level of tariffs prediction for the period 1988-2002.
The extended level of tariff prediction finds empirical support during the 1990s. We find that the median
voter component has a negative impact on tariffs in labor-abundant countries and a positive impact in
capital-abundant countries. Thus, labor-abundant countries tend to be “pro-trade” while capital-abundant
countries tend to be “protectionists”, as predicted by the median voter theorem. We find strong empirical
evidence for the positive influence of the terms of trade component. At even our highly aggregate cross-
country level, the optimal tariff argument (which postulates that tariffs are inversely proportional to the
export supply elasticity of a country) is empirically validated.
As mentioned earlier, the variation test supports the M-H-O model as well. In the 1980s and 1990s, we
find strong empirical support for a positive relationship between tariffs and inequality for high human capital
countries and a negative relationship for low human capital countries. This relationship holds in the 1990s
when it is tested for physical capital and unskilled labor but, not in the 1980s. Our results suggest that
human capital is the relevant variable for Mayer’s hypothesis in the 1980s. On the other hand, in the 1990s,
4Beaulieu and Magee (2004) segregate PACs into corporate PACs and labor PACs so there is no clear distinction between
physical and human capital in their paper.
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both human capital and physical capital yield similar results. Thus, both the variation and level predictions
of the M-H-O model are empirically validated in the 1990s.
To lay out these results, we start with the theoretical foundations of the small-country model and its
implications in Section 2. In Section 3, we set up the empirical model for the variation prediction. Section
4 explains our data sources while Section 5 contains a summary of the data used in the paper. Section 6
comprises of our results for the variation prediction. First, we contrast our findings with those of DM’s for
the 1980s. Then, we test the Mayer hypothesis using data on both human capital and physical capital in
the 1990s. We discuss the results and their robustness. In Section 7, we extend Mayer’s model to a large
country followed by the empirical model to test the large country level prediction. We lay out the results for
the large country level prediction. Finally, we present our conclusions in Section 8.
2. Theoretical Model: Small Country
In his model, Mayer uses a 2-sector, 2-factor small open economy to illustrate the dependence of tariff
rates on factor ownership distribution and voter eligibility and participation. Here, we will lay out the
hypotheses for a small open economy as in Mayer (1984).
We retain all the assumptions of Mayer (1984). There are two factors - labor (L) and capital (K). Each
agent (i) owns a unit of labor (Li = 1 ) and a certain fraction (σi ) of the total capital stock in the economy
(so Ki = σiK = ki is person i’s capital stock). Labor and capital are needed to produce two goods (1
and 2). Production functions for the two goods are homogeneous of degree one. Both factors are perfectly
mobile within these two industries. So, a unit of labor earns a wage rate (w) and a unit of capital earns a
rental rate (r), irrespective of the industry of employment. An agent who owns a unit of labor and Ki units
of capital earns total factor income equal to w + rKi. Thus, individual i’s share in national rewards from
factor ownership is:
(1) φi =
w + rKi
wL+ rK
In addition to factor earnings, agents receive a part of the national tariff revenue as well. Suppose the
domestic country imports M amount of good 1. Let t be the domestic import duty or tariff rate imposed
on good 1. Let pi denote the world relative price of good 1 in terms of good 2. Then the domestic country
obtains national tariff revenue worth T = tpiM . Mayer assumes that tariff sharing is neutral with respect
to the overall distribution of income. This implies that if agent i earns φi of the total factor rewards in the
economy, then she receives φi of the total tariff revenue T . In other words, the amount of tariff revenue
received by individual i is T i = φiT . Thus, individual i’s total income (yi) can be expressed as a fraction
(φi) of the total national income (Y ) because:
yi = w + rKi + T i = φi(wL+ rK + T ) = φiY
On the demand side, Mayer assumes that all agents have identical and homothetic preferences over goods.
Both goods are normal and traded in competitive markets. So, p = pi(1 + t) is the domestic price of good
1 in terms of good 2. Individual i chooses the tariff level that maximizes her utility subject to her budget
constraint. Thus, the optimization problem of individual i can be expressed in terms of her indirect utility
function (U i) as follows:
max
ti
U i
(
p
(
pi, ti
)
, yi
)
, i = 1, ..., I
Consumers have strictly concave utility functions. So, using Roy’s identity and homotheticity of the utility
function, we find that the optimal tariff for individual i satisfies:
dU i
dt
=
∂U i
∂yi
(
φitipi
dM
dt
+ Y
(
dφi
dt
))
= 0
The first term in brackets represents the change in tariff-weighted values of imports. The second term
denotes the change in individual’s income share. Using the above equation, agent i’s optimal tariff choice is:
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(2) t˜i =
(
− Y
pi dMdt
)(
dφi
dt
φi
)
Thus, in equilibrium, each voter has an optimal tariff rate that is unique to her factor ownership ratio.
According to the median voter hypothesis with single-peaked preferences, the adopted policy is determined
by the median voter’s (mv) preference (t˜mv ). So, the adopted trade policy in the domestic country is:
(3) t˜ = t˜mv =
(
− Y
pi dMdt
)(
dφmv
dt
φmv
)
Now, using 1 and Jones’ hat algebra, we can write,
dφmv
dt
=
[
wL
(wL+ rK)2(1 + t)
]
r(k − kmv)(wˆ − rˆ)
pˆ
where k = KL is the mean capital-labor ratio in the country. This equation implies that the individual-
specific income effect depends on two elements - person’s income share relative to the nation (k − kmv) and
the relative factor intensity of the import industry (which determines wˆ−rˆpˆ ). The first element is assumed
to be negative across countries (i.e. kmv < k).5 But the second element depends on factor abundance of the
country. An increase in tariff raises the domestic price. So by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, this results in
a higher income share for the agent if she is relatively well-endowed with the factor that is used intensively
in the production of the import good. On an economy-wide scale, by the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, in a
capital-abundant country, an increase in the price of the imported labor-intensive good will lead to a higher
factor reward for labor and a lower factor reward for capital, making (wˆ−rˆ)pˆ positive. This implies that the
derivative is positive for a capital-abundant country and negative for a capital-scarce country.
Putting this together in the expression for t˜mv, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2.1. Small Country Level Prediction:
The median voter in a small capital-abundant country supports tariffs on imports, while the median voter
in a small capital-scarce country supports subsidies on imports. Thus, by the median voter theorem, small
capital-abundant countries support tariffs on imports, while small capital-scarce countries support subsidies
on imports.
Import subsidies are rarely observed in practice. So, DM leave this level prediction aside and ask a
different question: What happens to trade barriers, if inequality increases, i.e., σmv = k
mv
K falls? Using
equation 2 and holding other things constant,
(4)
∂t
∂σmv
= −A (wˆ − rˆ)
pˆ
where,
A =
(
−Y
pi dMdt
)[
wL
(wL+ rK)(1 + t)
]
rK(w + rkmv + r(k − kmv))
(w + rkmv)2
> 0
This equation yields the following prediction for variation in tariffs across countries.
Proposition 2.2. Variation Prediction:
Higher inequality would cause tariff rates to rise in capital-rich countries and to fall in capital-scarce ones.
Thus, as pointed out by DM, we can use cross-country data on variations in trade barriers (instead of
their actual levels) to assess the impact of differences in inequality on differences in trade policy. This would
provide an indication of the empirical validity of Mayer’s model.
5We confirm this assumption for the countries in our sample. Also see Alesina and Rodrik for a discussion.
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3. Empirical Model: Variation Prediction
We start this section with DM’s test for the variation prediction. DM used equation 4 as a testable
implication of the Mayer model. They assumed a linear form for their analysis and used an interaction term
to allow for difference in signs between sub-groups of capital-abundant and capital-scarce countries. These
two features lead to estimating equation 5.
(5) tc = γ0 + γ1σmvc + γ2σ
mv
c kc + γ3kc +X
′
cδ + c
where tc refers to trade barriers in country c, Xc are control variables, Γ = (γ0, γ1, γ2, γ3, δ) are parameters
to be estimated and  refers to the vector of error terms. The specification implies that
∂tc
∂σmvc
= γ1 + γ2kc
Our aim is to test whether γ1 > 0 and γ2 < 0. With γ1 > 0 and γ2 < 0, we obtain a critical capital-labor
ratio (k∗) such that ∂tc∂σmvc
>
<0 for kc
<
>k
∗. The interaction term in 5 allows the sign of ∂tc∂σmvc to vary across
the subgroups of countries so we get an endogenous split in the sample that groups countries into categories
of high and low aggregate capital stock. Thus, the test implies that countries with lower kc ratios (those
less than the turning point ratio), reveal a positive (negative) relationship between equality (inequality)
and trade restrictiveness. On the other hand, countries with higher capital-labor ratios, show a negative
(positive) relationship between trade restrictiveness and equality (inequality).
Capital-labor ratio (kc) is included as a separate variable to allow ∂tc∂kc to differ in sign from γ2. However,
we suspect an endogeneity problem between trade policy and capital accumulation since trade policy could
affect the production structure of the economy, which in turn would have an impact on accumulation and
the steady state level of capital. Endogeneity yields inconsistent OLS estimates so we follow the approach
taken by Li et al (1998) and used in DM to test for endogeneity bias. The suspected endogenous variables
are σmv, σmvk and k. As in DM, we use instrumental variables - saving and population growth rates (Solow
growth model parameters), land gini (measure of initial distribution of land), ratio of money (M2) to GDP
(measure of financial development), civil liberties (measure of political factors as a structural variable) and
the exogenous variables in the regression equation for auxiliary regressions of our suspected endogenous
variables. The residuals are then used as right-hand side variables and tested for their joint significance. In
our sample, we do not encounter any endogeneity problems so all results are reported in Appendix B (Table
17). DM do not report instrumental variable regression results for the Summers-Heston and Easterly-Levine
datasets. But using the Nehru-Dhareshwar dataset, they find endogeneity in only one regression using tariffs.
The specification in 5 suffers from some problems. First, it assumes a linear form which is not implied by
the theoretical model. Second, it has the disadvantage that the turning point is sensitive to countries included
in the sample. As a result, countries close to the turning point ratio could switch categories. However, two
issues work in favor of this specification. First, we find in our results that the bulk of countries in the
sample continue to be in the same relationship category across regressions using different control variables
and different countries in the sample. Second, other approaches involving splitting of the sample into high
and low capital ownership countries suffer from being rather ad hoc in determining the value at which the
split is made.6 Thus, we continue to use the DM specification.7
4. Data Sources
Our data sources can be divided into two parts. Part 1 pertains to the 1980s. Part 2 pertains to the time
period 1988-2002.
6We experimented with the World Bank’s categorization of high-income and low-income countries to split the sample
(assuming that countries with higher income levels have higher capital and vice-versa). We find that the trade-inequality
correlation is as predicted by the Mayer hypothesis. Please see Appendix B for detailed results.
7Note that DM use (K/L) in logarithmic form. This is exactly the approach that we use for both physical capital and human
capital. Also, using different lags of right-hand side variables does not change our qualitative results. All unreported results
are available from the author upon request.
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Part 1. To compare our results with those of DM’s, we use their original dataset for all variables (including
capital-labor ratios). Data on inequality - income ginis and share of third quintile in national income - are
from DM’s original dataset. In the absence of asset inequality measures, income inequality measures are
used as proxies for capital inequality as in DM. We use DM’s data on tariff and import duties as measures
of trade restrictiveness. Tariff is an average of tariffs and charges imposed on imports and weighted by the
share of world trade of each good. Import duties refer to the total import duties collected as a percentage of
aggregate imports.8 For other regressions, we use data on capital-labor ratios and human capital available
in Baier et al (2006).
Part 2. For part 2, we use trade restrictiveness indices (TRIs) estimated by Kee et al (2006) for the period
1993-2002.9 The TRI is based on Anderson and Neary (2003) and has the advantage of being a composite
measure of trade protection which accounts for tariffs, duties and non-tariff barriers. Further, it does not
suffer from underestimation problems unlike the import-weighted average tariff.
Human capital and physical capital estimates for part 2 are from Baier et al (2006). For robustness check,
we use human capital stock estimated by Cohen and Soto (2001). Gini coefficients and quintile shares of
income in part 2 are taken from the World Income Inequality Database (WIID2), which is a corrected and
updated version of the Deininger & Squire income inequality database.
Data on the instruments in part 2 - population growth rates, saving rates, M2/GDP and GDP are from
World Development Indicators 2005 and on land ginis from Dutt and Mitra (2002) dataset. Polity variables
(political rights and civil liberties) of part 2 are from the Freedom House Gastil Index.
For the level test, data on imports, GDP, labor and tax revenue are from World Development Indicators
2006. The WTO dummy is categorized as zero for countries that were not members of the WTO during the
time period 1995-2002. Import elasticities, import quantities, import values and distance were taken from
the Trade and Production Database of the World Bank. For each variable in our analysis, averages of all
available years from 1988 to 2002 were taken so that the effects of explanatory variables on trade barriers
could be accounted for.
5. Data Description
Before laying out the empirical results, we briefly discuss the data used in the empirical tests.
Part 1. Key variables used in the empirical test for the 1980s are tariff, import duty, gini index, median
quintile’s share in national income (Q3), physical capital-labor ratio (K/L) and human capital index (HKI).
We use three different measures of physical capital-labor ratios. The physical capital-labor ratio ranges
from 170 to 166,476 for our largest dataset (Baier et al, 2006). The most capital-scarce country is Madagascar
while the most capital-abundant country is Kuwait. The K/L ratios are similar across the three datasets
for countries that do not export oil. But, there is substantial discrepancy in the K/L ratios of oil-exporting
nations. For instance, K/L estimates for Nigeria range from 1,000 to 3,960 and for Venezuela from 20,500
to 47,500. DM used a dummy to indicate oil-exporting countries. We have confirmed the validity of our
key results using a dummy for oil-exporting countries (See Appendix B). However, to avoid bias in the
estimates of key coefficients and the turning point due to the discrepancy in K/L data, we have excluded
all oil-exporting nations in our regressions. This amounts to dropping two to three observations in each
regression.
Tariff ranges from 0.01 to 1.32 across countries. However, India is a clear outlier since the maximum tariff
across all countries excluding India is 0.41. Import duty ranges from 0.06 to 41.38 when India is included
in the sample. But, the maximum import duty falls to 35.7 when India is excluded. Summary statistics for
the entire sample of countries are presented below.
8DM used two other measures of trade protection (X+M)/GDP (share of trade in GDP) and coverage ratio of quotas.
However, both these measures are unsatisfactory and results using these measures cannot be taken as evidence for or against
the Mayer hypothesis. The former is usually higher in smaller countries and is known to suffer from causality issues. And
the latter, as pointed out by DM in their paper, suffers from severe measurement error. Thus, we will not be using these two
measures in this paper.
9See Appendix B for formal definition. These indices are not available for the 1980s so for part 1, we use DM’s data on
tariff and import duties.
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Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Tariff 86 0.18 0.17 0.01 1.32
Import Duty 86 12.1 8.45 0.01 41.38
Q3 69 14.4 2.43 9.2 18.5
Gini 56 42 9 26.43 62.62
K/L 102 21,018 23,339 170 166,476
HKI 102 4.14 1.26 2.13 7.14
K/L refers to Baier et al (2006) capital-labor ratios
Human capital index ranges from 2.13 to 7.14 (USA) with Niger having the lowest HKIs. Q3 shares are
lowest in South Africa while Gini is highest in Lesotho. The highest Q3 shares and lowest Gini indices are in
Western Europe and the Czech Republic. Countries showing the lowest political rights ranking are Ethiopia,
Guinea, Pakistan and Bolivia.
Part 2. For the variation prediction of time period 1988-2002, key variables are the trade restrictiveness
index (TRI), gini index, Q3, K/L and HKI. Summary statistics of these variables for the entire sample of
countries are presented below.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
TRI 80 0.17 0.1 0.02 0.55
Q3 41 15.48 2.27 11.3 21.13
Gini 80 40.41 10.39 24.82 65
K/L 80 23,515 23,076 128 80,294
HKI 80 4.8 1.35 2.3 7.3
TRI is lowest in Estonia and greater than 0.4 in three countries (Tanzania, Algeria and Nigeria). Our
results in the subsequent sections are robust to exclusion of these countries. Inequality measured by Gini
is lowest in the Czech Republic and European Union countries. It is highest in Zimbabwe. Once again,
Western Europe is the region with highest physical capital while USA is the most skill-abundant. As earlier,
Madagascar has the lowest K/L ratio. The most skill-scarce countries are Mali and Ethiopia. Countries with
the lowest political rights are Laos, Cameroon, Vietnam and China.
6. Results: Variation Prediction
For the specification in 5, we use TRI (overall trade restrictiveness index) as a measure of tc in the 1990s
and tariffs & import duties in the 1980s. As in DM, we use Income Gini coefficients as well as Q3 (median
quintile’s share in national income) as proxies for capital inequality.10
Comparison with DM results (1980s): First, we present DM’s results for the 1980s using the Summers-
Heston (S-H) and the Easterly-Levine (E-L) capital data and compare them with our findings.11 In their
paper, DM reported two key regressions - reduced regression (without control variables) and controlled
regression (with five control variables). We use the same dataset and sample of countries as DM. We are
able to replicate DM’s results but find that their results are highly sensitive to the countries included in the
sample. Each of their regressions includes India which is a clear outlier. For instance, in the case of tariffs,
for a sample of 92 countries excluding India, the mean tariff is 0.16 and the maximum is 0.48. India on the
other hand has a tariff of 1.32. This is reflected in the high values of studentized residuals in each regression.
The studentized residuals for India range from 8.8 to 14 for tariff regressions and from 4 to 6 for import
duty regressions. Thus, India is an outlier in each regression. Given the small sizes of samples, this poses
an acute problem which can be exacerbated when another influential observation is present in the sample.
We find that two of the eight regressions have an influential observation (Sierra Leone) which has absolute
DFbeta values in excess of 2 for at least one of the key variables. Exclusion of India and Sierra Leone (when
it is an influential observation) from regression samples has a dramatic effect on six out of eight of DM’s
regression results. The coefficient values for two key variables (inequality measure and interaction term)
10For robustness check, we used human capital ginis from the Castello-Domenech dataset (Castello and Domenech, 2002)
for the human capital regressions in both time periods. The results support the variation and level tests and are available from
the author upon request.
11DM used the Nehru-Dhareshwar (ND) capital-labor ratios for their main regressions. We do not report these results due
to inconsistencies in the ND dataset which have been confirmed by DM in a personal communication.
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change and their significance levels drop so drastically that we can no longer reject the null hypothesis that
these coefficients are zero.12 Results for tariffs are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Dependent Variable: Tariff - Using Summer-Heston’s (K/L) ratio
(a) (b) (c) (d)
DM W/o outliers DM W/o outliers
Gini -0.144** -0.046 Q3 0.324*** 0.021
(0.06) (0.04) (0.09) (0.08)
Gini * (K/L) 0.014** 0.005 Q3 * (K/L) -0.034*** -0.004
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
(K/L) -0.938*** -0.288† (K/L) 0.275** -0.037
(0.26) (0.17) (0.13) (0.12)
Schooling 0.035† 0.013 Schooling 0.005 0.004
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Pol. Rights -0.006 -0.002 Pol. Rights -0.051* -0.023
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
SS Africa -0.345* 0.127 SS Africa -0.206* -0.072
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.07)
East Asia -0.257* 0.046 East Asia -0.126 0.006
(0.14) (0.09) (0.13) (0.07)
Oil 0.208† 0.146* Oil -0.039 0.027
(0.13) (0.08) (0.18) (0.10)
Constant 9.274*** 2.583† Constant -2.245* 0.812
(2.41) (1.69) (1.20) (1.11)
N 31 30 N 33 31
R2 0.7 0.62 R2 0.54 0.64
(K/L)* 10.3 (K/L)* 9.4
# of obs excluded 0 1 (India) # of obs excluded 0 2 (India, Sierra Leone)
Studentized Res. 11 8.8
Compare w/DM Same Different Compare w/DM Same Different
Note: Absolute DFbeta values for Sierra Leone range from 1.8-2.2.
Significance Levels: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent, † 15 percent.
It is clear that the coefficient values and significance levels are very sensitive to the countries used in
the sample. However, the insignificance of key variables cannot be taken as evidence against the Mayer
implication because our estimates suffer from a classic symptom of multicollinearity - large standard errors
of individual variables and high R-squared coefficients. The bivariate correlation of the inequality term (gini
or q3) and the corresponding interaction terms ranges from 0.86 to 0.91. We tested for the joint significance
of the first two variables gini (q3) and gini*(K/L) (q3*(K/L)), but our results are inconclusive. For some of
the regressions, the null hypothesis of joint insignificance can be rejected but for others it cannot. Further,
the results are extremely sensitive to dropping of one or two observations. We tried centering the data on
gini and q3 but the problem persisted. For detailed results, see Appendix B.
Results for four other regressions - using tariffs or import duties and Easterly-Levine capital-labor ratios
- are similar so they are reported in Tables 11 and 13 in Appendix B. In the remaining two regressions using
import duties and Summers-Heston capital-labor ratios, DM’s qualitative results do not change when India
is dropped from the sample. However, we detect an endogeneity problem here and cannot reject the null
hypothesis of zero coefficients when DM’s instrumental variables are used (See Table 12, Appendix B).
Overall, the results from DM’s controlled regressions using physical capital to test the variation prediction
are not robust.
12We used a robust estimation technique - MM-estimator - to cross-check the sensitivity of our results. Using the MM-
estimator, DM’s qualitative results are rejected in five out of eight cases. For the reduced regressions, we can reject the variation
prediction for physical capital in three out of four cases. For reduced regressions using human capital, we cannot reject the
variation prediction in any regression.
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Cross-check with Reduced Specification of DM Regressions (1980s): In the regression above, DM
used five control variables - schooling, political rights, oil and two location dummies for sub-Saharan Africa
and East Asia. We argue that some of these control variables are inappropriate. First, using schooling as
a control variable has little theoretical justification. It is highly correlated with human capital which is a
separate factor (correlation coefficient of 0.9). Treating it as a control variable that accounts for development
or “people’s ability to figure out the dead-weight costs of distortionary government policies favoring special
interest groups”13 does not seem compelling. Further, the correlation between schooling, K/L and political
rights may explain the insignificance of some of these variables.
Second, while controlling for political rights and oil could be justified (See Appendix A for a formal
argument), we think that exclusion of countries with low political rights and oil exports has greater merit.
As mentioned earlier, exclusion of oil countries is on account of a data issue. However, our key results are
robust to using a dummy variable for oil-exporting countries (Appendix B, Tables 20 and 21).
Exclusion of countries with low political rights is appropriate due to two reasons. First, Mayer is concerned
with countries which have majoritarian voting. Second, it can be argued that individuals who have low capital
endowment in countries with very low political rights are likely to be disenfranchised. So, the median voter
among the set of effective voters of a low political right country has a higher income level than would be the
case if the country had a better political rights situation. In our dataset, the political rights variable (PR)
takes on values from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating the highest level of political rights. We present results for all
our regressions using the entire sample as well as a sub-sample of countries with political rights (PR) less
than five. The subset of countries with PR less than five corresponds to the top 75 per cent of countries in
terms of political rights in our entire sample.
We report the results of the reduced regressions using our largest dataset (Baier et al, 2006) in Table 2.
Results for import duties are in Table 13 of Appendix B.14
Table 2. Dependent Variable: Tariff
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Pol. Rights < 5 Pol. Rights < 5
Gini -0.011 Too Q3 0.026 0.103†
(0.02) few (0.06) (0.07)
Gini * (K/L) 0.001 obs. Q3 * (K/L) -0.004 -0.011†
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
(K/L) -0.115 (K/L) 0.012 0.084
(0.08) (0.10) (0.11)
Constant 1.164† Constant 0.238 -0.611
(0.80) (0.99) (1.08)
N 42 N 47 30
R2 0.5 R2 0.44 0.7
F-statistic for joint test F-statistic for joint test
(Gini and Gini*(K/L)) 1.28 (Q3 and Q3*(K/L)) 1.77 1.28
We find the key terms (inequality and interaction) to be individually significant in only one regression
using tariffs. But, for the corresponding regression using import duties, we get the unexpected signs on
our key estimates. But, once again there is a multicollinearity problem. The R-squared coefficients for the
regressions of inequality, interaction term and capital-labor ratios on each other are over 0.95 in each case.
We are able to reject the joint significance of our two key variables in all regressions. However, this has little
meaning in the case of Q3 regressions since all three variables are highly correlated so we cannot separate
the effect of the first two.
Therefore, using physical capital as the relevant factor in Mayer’s framework in the 1980s, we can at best
say that the test is inconclusive and at worst say that the Mayer implication can be rejected.
13Dutt and Mitra (2002), pp. 124.
14While DM do not report the reduced regressions using the S-H and E-L datasets, we have checked that including the
two to three influential countries in the sample would yield results that support the Mayer implication. However, when these
influential observations are dropped, the results once again lead to a rejection of the Mayer hypothesis.
RE-EXAMINATION OF THE MAYER MEDIAN VOTER MODEL OF TRADE POLICY 11
So, the natural question is: Since, we do not find strong evidence regarding the Mayer implication in the
1980s, should we abandon the Mayer hypothesis as an explanation for trade protection in this time period?
Rejecting the hypothesis would be inconsistent with results from other papers that have found an explicit
link between trade preferences and factor ownership of voters and their representatives. Previous work has
compared preferences of skilled and unskilled labor so it guides us to regard human capital as the relevant
capital variable in equation 4. And, this indeed supports the Mayer hypothesis.
Human Capital and Trade Barriers: We use two different measures of human capital - Cohen & Soto
indices (C-S) and Baier et al indices. The C-S dataset has the advantage of greater conformity to national
censuses. However their dataset does not cover many former USSR countries. The Baier et al dataset
(2006) on the other hand covers more countries and uses the World Development Reports and the Mitchell
datasets. It is also based on theoretical foundations and reduces the problem inherent in use of measures
such as average years of schooling. So we use this dataset for our main regression and cross-check the results
with the Cohen-Soto dataset, presented in Appendix B (Table 18).
Human Capital and Trade Barriers (1980s): Using human capital measures, we are unable to reject
the Mayer implication. The results are reported in Tables 3 and 4 below.
Table 3. Dependent Variable: Tariff
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Pol. Rights < 5 Pol. Rights < 5
Gini -0.031*** Too Q3 0.071* 0.148***
(0.01) few (0.04) (0.05)
Gini * HKI 0.022*** obs. Q3 * HKI -0.056** -0.1***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
HKI -1.109*** HKI 0.662† 1.222**
(0.31) (0.43) (0.50)
Constant 1.784*** Constant -0.622 -1.612**
(0.48) (0.61) (0.71)
N 42 N 47 32
R2 0.5 R2 0.4 0.6
HKI* 1.42 HKI* 1.27 1.49
HKI* = Critical HKI Value
Table 4. Dependent Variable: Import Duty
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Pol. Rights < 5 Pol. Rights < 5
Gini -1.596** -1.662* Q3 3.887** 4.793†
(0.672) (0.931) (1.91) (1.91)
Gini * HKI 1.2*** 1.185* Q3 * HKI -2.97** -3.441*
(0.457) (0.601) (1.32) (1.99)
HKI -61.614*** -61.49*** HKI 32.533† 32.515
(17.575) (23.373) (20.24) (28.98)
Constant 95.256*** 98.35*** Constant -30.022 -31.608
(26.767) (37.54) (28.31) (44.13)
N 42 31 N 56 33
R2 0.57 0.6 R2 0.4 0.6
HKI* 1.33 1.4 HKI* 1.31 1.39
Not only are the results statistically significant and robust, but they also have the expected theoretical
interpretation. We find that the net effect of inequality on tariffs and import duties is positive in countries
with higher levels of human capital and negative in countries with scarce human capital resources. So, we
find considerable support for the M-H-O model in the 1980s.
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Human Capital, Physical Capital and Trade Barriers (1990s): Our next step is to check the link
between trade restrictions and inequality in factor ownership in the 1990s. For this time period, we have a
larger dataset and superior measures of trade restrictiveness for our purposes. We use both physical capital
and human capital as relevant factors in separate regressions presented in Tables 5 and 6.15
Table 5. Dependent Variable: Trade Restrictiveness Index
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Pol. Rights < 5 Pol. Rights < 5
Gini -0.017** -0.014** Q3 0.13*** 0.13**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06)
Gini * (K/L) 0.002** 0.002** Q3 * (K/L) -0.014*** -0.014**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.005) (0.006)
(K/L) -0.088*** -0.071** (K/L) 0.19*** 0.195**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.076)
Constant 0.952*** 0.78*** Constant -1.67** -1.7**
(0.31) (0.31) (0.67) (0.762)
N 72 61 N 37 30
R2 0.15 0.15 R2 0.24 0.23
(K/L)* 8.9 8.7 (K/L)* 9.3 9.5
(K/L)* = Critical Physical Capital-Labor Ratio
Table 6. Dependent Variable: Trade Restrictiveness Index
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Pol. Rights < 5 Pol. Rights < 5
Gini -0.014** -0.011** Q3 0.13** 0.175***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.055) (0.061)
Gini * HKI 0.009** 0.008** Q3 * HKI -0.08** -0.108***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.036)
HKI -0.451*** -0.364** HKI 1.12** 1.466***
(0.03) (0.15) (0.468) (0.491)
Constant 0.848*** 0.691*** Constant -1.584** -2.19***
(0.25) (0.25) (0.762) (0.803)
N 72 61 N 37 30
R2 0.2 0.2 R2 0.36 0.41
HKI* 1.5 1.44 HKI* 1.6 1.62
The results are remarkably similar - the gini (Q3) term in each case is negative (positive) and significant
and the interaction term is positive (negative) and significant. Our results are robust to exclusion of countries
with low political rights. The key results are unaltered when we use the Cohen-Soto human capital index
as well. Moreover, the split in the sample does not show any anomalous categorization (Figure 6.1) and the
results clearly reflect the difference in tariff-inequality relationship across the two categories of human-capital
endowment (Figure 6.2).
These results imply that higher inequality is associated with greater protectionism in countries with higher
levels of physical capital and/or human capital, and with less restrictiveness in countries with lower levels
of physical capital and/or human capital. Thus, we conclude that evidence supports the Mayer implication
regarding trade preferences and ownership of physical capital and/or human capital strongly in the 1990s.
In the 1980s, this is true for ownership of human capital but the same cannot be said about physical capital.
15Our results are robust to treatment of European Union member countries as one observation.
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Figure 1. Countries by Human Capital Index (Corresponds to Table 8, HKI* = 1.5)
Countries with high human capital Countries with low human capital
Albania Finland Nicaragua Bangladesh Kenya Thailand
Argentina France Norway Bolivia Kyrgyzstan Tunisia
Australia Germany Peru Brazil Laos Uganda
Austria Greece Philippines Cameroon Madagascar Vietnam
Belarus Hungary Poland Central Afr. Rep. Malawi Zambia
Belgium Ireland Portugal China Malaysia Zimbabwe
Canada Italy Romania Colombia Mali
Chile Latvia Spain El Salvador Mozambique
Costa Rica Lithuania Sweden Ethiopia Nepal
Czech Republic Mexico Switzerland Ghana Pakistan
Denmark Moldova United Kingdom Guatemala Papua N. Guinea
Ecuador Netherlands United States Honduras Paraguay
Estonia New Zealand Uruguay India Tanzania
Figure 2. TRI-Inequality Relationship by Human Capital Scarcity (H-Scarce), 1990s
Human Capital Abundant Countries (H-Scarce = 0) Human Capital Scarce Countries (H-Scarce = 1)
Discussion. A possible explanation for the finding could be simply that data on human capital (H) is
better than data on physical capital (K). Therefore, we get inconclusive results with the latter in the
1980s. However, greater dissatisfaction has been expressed with data on human capital (see de la Fuente
and Doménech (2002) for a review), so this does not seem plausible.
It can be also argued that countries with higher human capital endowment also had a higher physical
capital stock in the 1980s. So for the 1980s, H is a better measure of total capital stock (TK) because it
not only accounts for skills, but also implicitly takes into account ownership of physical capital (K). If this
is the case, then H is clearly the correct measure to be used, since it robustly captures a link between factor
ownership and policy that physical capital measures fail to do.
One approach to resolve this is to combine H and K to obtain a single measure for TK. But, this poses
some problems. Theoretically, aggregation of different forms of capital implicitly assumes that they are
perfect substitutes or complements (See Balassa, 1979, pp. 260). We do not have such explicit knowledge of
the relationship between H and K across countries. In fact, in the specific case of US trade, Branson and
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Monoyios (1977) find that the correlation of net exports across commodities is negative and only “marginally
significant” with physical capital but, is positive and significant for human capital and negative and significant
for labor (pp. 113 and 117). So, they advise against aggregation of physical and human capital measures.
Even if aggregation is theoretically justified in our case, it is difficult because of the nature of available
data. Physical capital data is available in value terms while human capital is in an index form. So, simple
aggregation is infeasible.16 To ensure that the discreteness of human capital measures (as opposed to the
continuous value form of physical capital) was not responsible for the difference in results across these two
forms of capital in the 1980s, we used an index of physical capital instead but, that did not satisfy the Mayer
hypothesis in the 1980s either.
Given our limited success with physical capital in the 1980s, another reason, and one that agrees with
previous literature can be advanced in favor of the results of this paper. Becker (1980) stresses that “small
investments in human capital” yield “considerably higher payoffs than those in physical capital”, so one would
expect a greater share of small endowments to be placed in human capital.17 Hornstein et al (2005) use data
from the US and report that returns to education rose dramatically in the 1980s and then grew at a slower
pace in the 1990s.
“The return to post-college education doubled from 1970 to 1990...The returns to experience
increased in the 1970s and the 1980s and leveled off in the 1990s.” (Hornstein et al, 2005,
pp. 1283-85).
So, viewed in the context of the Mayer model, voters had an incentive to invest in human capital in the 1980s.
This would imply that K is much more unequally distributed than H during the 80s. Thus, the median
voter’s trade preference is largely determined by the impact of trade policy on relative wages of skilled and
unskilled labor, rather than on rents from ownership of physical capital. Hence, during this time period, H
is the primary factor of interest for the Mayer hypothesis and not K. Hornstein et al (2005) report further
that in the 1990s, the growth of returns to education had dampened in the US, but equipment-embodied
productivity growth was increasing substantially (pp. 1283 and 1293). This would imply that the median
voter had an incentive to invest in K as well. So, both factors K and H assume a comparable level of
importance in the Mayer framework.18Though these findings are limited to the US, they suggest a possible
role for private investment decisions which can be incorporated within the M-H-O framework to reconcile
our different results regarding the validity of the Mayer implication in the 1980s and the 1990s.
7. Large Country
Theoretical Model. Since the variation prediction is empirically validated in both time periods, we can
now take the next step to test the M-H-O model. In this section, we extend Mayer’s model to the case of a
large country that has the ability to influence its terms of trade. We retain the original M-H-O framework.
But, when a country is large, world prices respond to changes in its tariffs. So, we need to make some
additional assumptions regarding the impact of tariffs on prices.
Suppose, as earlier, that the domestic country imposes a tariff t on its imports of good 1. Similarly, let t∗
be the tariff imposed by the foreign country on its imports of good 2. Then world prices can be expressed
as a function of tariff levels, i.e., pi = pi(t, t∗). Domestic and foreign prices of good 1 with respect to good 2
are p = (1 + t)pi(t, t∗) and p∗ = pi(t,t
∗)
1+t∗ respectively.
Now, let pit =
dpi(·,t∗)
dt be the change in world relative price with respect to the domestic tariff, given t
∗.
Similarly, let pit∗ =
dpi(t,·)
dt∗ denote the change in world relative price with respect to the foreign tariff, given
t . We define a “small” country as one that does not have the ability to manipulate its terms of trade. In
16We tried to combine H and K through two different methods. In the first one, we used the Cobb-Douglas production
coefficients for human and physical capital as weights to construct a measure of total capital. This index did not support the
Mayer hypothesis. In the second case, we used the stock definition of total capital in Balassa (1979) to aggregate H and K.
This required using the discounted difference between skilled and unskilled wages as a proxy for human capital per worker.
However, using the Freeman-Oostendrop dataset for wages, we were left with very few observations and could not implement
this approach. Lack of data also prevented us from using expenditure on schooling across countries to convert the human capital
indices into value form.
17See Becker (1980), pp. 130-33.
18DM recognize the importance of human capital in their paper as well (pp. 112). But, they argue that in the 1980s,
physical capital is a good proxy for total capital and therefore, it reflects ownership of human capital as well. However, our
results reveal otherwise - H, rather than K is the correct measure to be used in the Mayer framework.
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other words, the domestic country is small if pit = 0. On the other hand, the domestic country is “large” if
pit 6= 0. Following Bagwell and Staiger (1999), we make some standard assumptions regarding changes in
prices with respect to tariffs. In particular, we assume that for large domestic and foreign countries,
pit < 0 <
dp
dt
and pit∗ > 0 >
dp∗
dt∗
Thus, a change in domestic tariff of a large home country has a strictly negative impact on world relative
price.
Under the assumptions made earlier and given t∗, individual i in the domestic country chooses a tariff
level that maximizes the following objective function:
max
ti
U
(
p
(
pi(ti, t∗), ti
)
, yi
)
As earlier, using Roy’s identity and homotheticity of the utility function, we find that the optimal tariff
for individual i satisfies:
dU i
dt
=
∂U i
∂yi
(
φitipi
dM
dt
+ Y
(
dφi
dt
)
+ (−φiMpit)
)
= 0
The first term in brackets represents the change in tariff-weighted values of imports, the second term
denotes the change in individual’s income share and the third term denotes the ability to effect a terms of
trade improvement.
Using the balance of trade condition (whereby the quantity of good 1 imported by the home country M
must equal the quantity of good 1 exported by the foreign country E∗), agent i’s optimal tariff choice is:
t˜i =
(
− Y
pi dMdt
)(
dφi
dt
φi
)
+
1
η∗
where η∗ is the export supply elasticity of good 1, i.e., η∗ = piE∗
dE∗
dpi .
With single-peaked preferences, the median voter theorem implies that the adopted policy in a large
domestic country is:
(6) t˜ = t˜mv =
(
− Y
pi dMdt
)(
dφmv
dt
φmv
)
+
1
η∗
where
dφmv
dt
=
[
L
(wL+ rK)2
]
(k − kmv)
(
r
dw
dt
− wdr
dt
)
As in Mayer’s small country model, the first component of the optimal tariff is positive in a capital-
abundant country and negative in a labor abundant country. But, unlike the small country model, there is
a non-zero second term which is positive for all large countries. So, if a capital-scarce country has sufficient
market power in its import market i.e., (−pit)MY > 1φmv
(
−dφmvdt
)
, then the positive impact of the terms of
trade component outweighs the negative impact of the median voter component. In this case, the median
voter in a large capital-scarce country supports tariffs on imports. Moreover, the magnitude of the first
component increases with a fall in the median voter’s capital ownership. Thus, capital ownership inequality
and tariff levels are positively related in capital-abundant countries and negatively related in labor-abundant
countries. So, labor-abundant countries with high import share and market power vis-a-vis inequality in
capital ownership do not subsidize imports.
In other words, as long as the share of imports to GDP (piMY ) in a labor-abundant country exceeds the
ratio of median voter’s factor share elasticity (eφmvt) to world price elasticity (epit) with respect to domestic
tariffs, a labor-abundant country will impose positive tariffs on its imports. This gives us the following
proposition.
Proposition 7.1. Large Country Level Prediction:
The optimal tariff in a large country is a sum of the median voter component and a terms of trade factor.
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Under standard assumptions, the median voter in a capital-abundant country supports tariffs on imports
because both the median voter and the terms of trade components are positive.
Under standard assumptions, the terms of trade component in large labor-abundant countries is positive
while the median voter component is negative. If the share of imports to GDP and market power are large
enough so that piMY >
eφmvt
epit
, then the positive impact of the terms of trade component outweighs the negative
impact of the median voter component. Under this condition, the median voter in a large capital-scarce
country supports tariffs on imports.
Thus, the unrealistic result of import subsidization in a capital-scarce country does not hold if the country
is sufficiently engaged in the world market. Olarreaga et al (1999) remark that “the relevance of the “small”
country assumption may be limited to a small number of cases, as Mercosur represents only 1 per cent
of world markets, but terms-of-trade effects seem to be relatively important” (pp. 23). Therefore, it is
likely that most countries across the world can be considered sufficiently large. This implies that the level
prediction may not be unrealistic after all.
We combine the results from the small and large country propositions to get the following set of Mayer
hypotheses that form the basis of our empirical tests.
Table 7. Mayer Hypotheses
Country Type Assumptions r dwdt − w drdt dφ
mv
dt η
∗ t˜ dt˜dσmv
1a) Small K-abundant pit = 0 + + 0 + -
1b) Small L-abundant pit = 0 - - 0 - +
2a) Large K-abundant pit < 0 < dpdt + + + + -
2b) Large L-abundant pit < 0 < dpdt - - + ? +
piM
Y >
eφmvt
epit
- - + + +
It is noteworthy that the large country extension preserves the variation prediction. The expression for
∂t
∂σmv is the same, irrespective of the size of a country. Thus, our results from the previous section are valid
for both small and large countries.
Empirical Model: Large Country Level Prediction. The variation prediction is unchanged when we
consider large countries. So, this section contains the empirical model to test the level prediction for the
large country case. We test whether the median voter component has a negative impact on tariff levels in
low capital countries and a positive impact on tariff levels in high capital countries. We evaluate the role of
terms of trade considerations in tariff-setting.
From the optimal tariff equation 6, we know that the equilibrium tariff level is a sum of the median voter
component (M˜V ) and a terms of trade factor (ToT ). Thus, the optimal tariff can be written as:
t˜ = M˜V + ToT =
Y
(Y − T )2 (1− σ
mv)K
[
1
φmv
(
− 1
pi dMdt
)(
r
dw
dt
− wdr
dt
)]
+ ToT
We do not have data on the terms in square brackets in the above equation. So, we cannot construct tariff
levels predicted by the median voter model for comparison with actual tariff levels. Instead, we account for
as much variation in the median voter component as possible with available data. In particular, let
MVc =
Yc
(Yc − Tc)2 (1− σ
mv
c )Kc =
[
1
φmv
(
− 1
pi dMdt
)(
r
dw
dt
− wdr
dt
)]−1
c
M˜Vc
So, MVc increases the absolute value of the median voter component. But,
[
1
φmv
(
− 1
pi dMdt
) (
r dwdt − w drdt
)]−1
c
is negative in labor-abundant countries and positive in capital-abundant countries. Thus, MVc decreases
tariff levels in labor-abundant countries and increases tariff levels in capital-abundant countries.
Now we consider the ToT component. In the absence of cross-country export supply elasticity estimates,
we need to impose more structure on the import demand and export supply curves before proceeding to
empirics. We adopt the assumptions made in Bagwell and Staiger (2006). In particular, demand for good
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1 in the home country is given by D1 = a1 − b1p while supply of good 1 in the foreign country is given by
S∗1 = A
∗
1 +B
∗
1pi. Thus,
dM
dt = −(b1 +B1)dpdt and dE
∗
dt = (b
∗
1 +B
∗
1)pit which implies that
pit =
−pi(b1 +B1)
(b∗1 +B
∗
1) + (b1 +B1)
Hence, equation 6 can be expressed as follows:
(7) t˜ = M˜V +
(
1
−pi dMdt [(b∗1 +B∗1) + (b1 +B1)]
)
(piM(b1 +B1))
The third term in brackets is positive. We have data on the import weighted elasticity of imports for the
home country (e) as well as the foreign countries (e∗) at the 3-digit ISIC level. So, we can construct the last
term in brackets by using data on imports and import-weighted elasticities.
Using this version of equation 6, we now obtain a linear estimating equation:
(8) tc = θ1MVc + θ2MVckc + θ3ToTc + Z
′
cζ + εc
where, Zc denotes a vector of control variables, Θ = (θ1, θ2, θ3, ζ) is a vector of parameters to be estimated
and ε denotes a vector of errors.
As earlier, we use an interaction term to allow for the sign change across sub-groups of high and low
capital countries. So, it follows that when θ1 < 0 and θ2 > 0, we obtain a critical capital-labor ratio (k∗)
such that θ1MVc+θ2MVckc ><0 ∀kc ><k∗. Hence, high capital endowment countries favor positive tariffs while
low capital endowment countries favor negative tariffs, on account of the median voter component.19
On the other hand, we expect a positive coefficient on ToTc across all countries because it denotes the
terms of trade component of tariff levels. We use the product of imports and weighted elasticities (m · e)
as a proxy for ToTc.20 But, this formulation leads us to a potential inconsistency of OLS estimates. OLS
estimates will be inconsistent if tariff levels during the period affect the amount of imports in that period or if
there is a severe measurement error associated with elasticity estimates. Therefore, we report estimates from
instrumental variables regressions. Following a gravity equation approach, we use GDP as an instrument for
m · e. The correlation between t and GDP is -0.02.
We use four control variables - an intercept, capital per worker (kc) and WTO membership.21 An intercept
is included to avoid sensitivity arising due to use of a proxy for ToTc and the impact of WTO membership.
Capital per worker (kc) is included as a separate variable to allow the sign of its coefficient to differ from
the sign of the interaction term coefficient (θ3). We include a dummy indicating WTO members because the
terms of trade theory of trade agreements implies that members will re-adjust their tariffs to overcome the
ToT externality. We expect the coefficient on WTO to be negative since tariff bindings tend to lower the
ability to manipulate terms of trade.
We estimate equation 8 and then test whether the signs on the key variables agree with those predicted
by the extended M-H-O model (last column of Table 8).
Table 8. Level Test
Variable Coefficient Expected Sign
MVc θ1 (-)
MVckc θ2 (+)
ToTc θ3 (+)
19Since (1−σmvc )kc is a measure of inequality, by the variation prediction, we must obtain another critical ratio determined
by ∂tc
∂(1−σmvc )kc = θ1 + θ2k
∗∗ = 0. But (1− σmvc ) is positive across countries, so both turning points are equal, i.e., k∗ = k∗∗.
Thus, the split obtained from k∗ is enough to guarantee that the median voter component and the tariff-inequality relationship
are negative in countries with kc < k∗and positive in countries with kc > k∗. The variation and level predictions are consistent
with each other.
20There are some extreme observations for imports so we use the product of imports and weighted elasticities in logarithmic
form.
21Note that we do not have any de facto members of the GATT in our sample.
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Level Test: Data. Cross-country export supply elasticity estimates are not available. So, we construct
two forms of ToT as mentioned earlier. Summary statistics for import-weighted elasticities, imports, share
in world imports (V alue of Imports of country cV alue of World Imports ) and the median voter term (MV ) are provided below.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
MV 35 1.2 1.35 0.03 5.4
e 35 1.1 0.065 1.03 1.33
m 35 671 1,732.8 8.68 9,225.7
Import Share (%) 68 0.7 2.14 0.007 16.21
In our sample, the median voter term is highest in Norway and lowest in Madagascar. Elasticity is lowest
in Nicaragua and high in USA and India. Imports are measured in billion units. None of the countries in
our sample have zero imports. Imports are lowest in Madagascar and highest in USA. Import shares range
from 0.014 per cent (Malawi and Mali) to 16.3 per cent (USA).
Level Test: Results. Results of the level test using q3 data for the period 1988-2002 are given below.
Column (a) of Table 9 contains results for the small country version of Mayer’s model while columns (b) and
(c) contain results from specification 7.
Table 9. Dependent Variable: Trade Restrictiveness Index
ToT = 0 ToT : Log(m · e)
(a) (b) (c)
OLS OLS IV
MV -14.52*** -16.05*** -16.1***
(3.32) (3.31) (3.07)
MV *HKI 9.77*** 11.18*** 11.27***
(2.24) (2.33) (2.22)
HKI -0.262*** -0.313*** -0.318***
(0.073) (0.081) (0.077)
ToT 0.017** 0.019*
(0.008) (0.01)
WTO -0.075*** -0.078***
(0.018) (0.02)
Constant 0.58*** 0.3 0.25
(0.131) (0.205) (0.24)
N 34 34 34
R2 0.32 0.41 0.41
HKI* 1.49 1.44 1.44
The median voter variable and the interaction term are both statistically significant and have the expected
signs. This implies that the median voter component is positive in all countries with human capital greater
than 1.44 and vice-versa (See Figure 7.1). The critical HKI* is similar to the turning point from the variation
test (Table 6(a)). Thus, the categorization of countries is fairly consistent across the variation and level tests.
Inclusion of terms of trade variables increases the R2 from 0.32 to 0.41. The terms of trade component is
positive and significant indicating that market power increases tariff levels across countries (See Figure 7.2).
The WTO dummy has the expected negative sign so we find evidence of lower terms of trade manipulation
among WTO members.
Robustness Check: We use value of imports instead of units of imports in the specification above and
find no change in the qualitative results (Appendix B, Table 19). The results are not sensitive to use of
import-weighted distance and population as instruments.
Next, we use an alternative expression for equation 6:
(9) t˜ =
(
− MVc
(b1 +B1)c
)[
1
φmv
(
r
dw
dt
− wdr
dt
)]
+
(
pi−1
)( M
(b∗1 +B
∗
1)
)
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Figure 3. Estimated Median Voter Component (M˜Vc) by Human Capital Endowment
Estimated M˜Vc <>0 forHKI
<
>1.44
Corresponds to Table 9 (b)
Figure 4. TRI and Import Shares for Non-Members of WTO, 1988-2002
Once again, we can construct the first and last terms in brackets with available data. So, we obtain
another estimating equation as follows:
tc = θ
′
1
MVc
(b1 +B1)c
+ θ
′
2
MVc
(b1 +B1)c
kc + θ
′
3ToT
′
c + Z
′
cζ
′
+ ε
′
c
where once again, we expect θ
′
1 < 0, θ
′
2 > 0 and θ
′
3 > 0. Results from specification 9 are qualitatively very
similar and induce similar categorizations (Appendix B, Table 19).
Thus, during the 1990s, we find evidence of both the Mayer median voter hypothesis and the terms
of trade argument for tariff-setting. Capital-abundant countries tend to have higher tariffs while labor-
abundant countries tend to have lower tariffs on account of general interest considerations. Terms of trade
considerations exert a positive influence on tariff levels while WTO membership tends to lower tariff levels.
8. Conclusion
We have tested the Mayer variation prediction using physical capital and labor as well as human capital
and labor. Our results show that the Mayer implication holds for human capital, but not for physical capital
in the 1980s. However, in the 1990s, the Mayer implication is supported using either factor. Our findings
suggest that voters’ decisions regarding choice of investment are relevant issues which need to be explored
in future research.
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We extend the Mayer theorem to large countries and test the predictions. Results for the large country
level test support the Mayer framework. The ability to manipulate world prices through domestic tariffs
influences tariff choice in large countries. We find that the median voter’s factor ownership exerts pressure to
lower tariffs in labor-abundant countries and to increase tariffs in capital-abundant countries. Thus, general
interest motivations and terms of trade considerations are important determinants of the direction of tariffs
adopted across countries.
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Appendix A: Disenfranchisement
Here we present a formal explanation for why countries with low political rights will tend to bias results
based on the median voter theorem. In order to do this, we will need some terms, and within a country let
W stand for wealth and let fW (w) denote the distribution of wealth in terms of population frequency. We
will denote the maximum observed wealth as w, so for example, per capita wealth is given by∫ w
0
wfW (w)dw
In order to capture the effect of political rights in a country, r, we introduce the idea of disenfranchisement.
In the UN’s terminology,
“rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”
for our purposes, this is in opposition to
“rights derived from status, privilege, and influence associated with wealth”
In accordance with the UN’s terms, consider a country where all individuals are equal in terms of their
voice in governance. Then we should expect that a group of individuals with wealth in [w1, w2] should have
“effective voting mass” equal to their “population mass”, namely
"effective voting mass" ≈
∫ w2
w1
fW (w)dw
However, in a country with low political rights we should expect that those with great wealth have a voice
in governance disproportionate to their population mass.22 In other words
"effective voting mass of wealthy" >
∫
wealthy
fW (w)dw
"effective voting mass of poor" <
∫
poor
fW (w)dw
A natural way to introduce disenfranchisement is then to weight the population mass by a function of
wealth and rights, say e(w, r) (for enfranchisement) where we assume that:
(1) e(w, r) is normalized for each r, or rather∫ w
0
e(w, r)fW (w)dw = 1 ∀r
(2) For rights r, less political rights r′ < r magnifies disenfranchisement in the sense that
r′ < r implies e(w,r
′)
e(w,r) is strictly increasing in w
It turns out these conditions imply that when r′ < r that for “low” w we have
e(w, r′) < e(w, r)
and for “high” w that
e(w, r′) > e(w, r)
so that 2 does in fact capture the idea that as rights decrease, the poor have increasingly less “effective votes”
and the wealthy have increasingly more “effective votes”.
Given population weights e(w, r) we may then define the effective median voter m as
m ≡
∫ m
0
e(w, r)fw(w)dw =
1
2
(10)
Regarding the effective median voter and rights, we have the following result:
Proposition. (Rights) Lowering political rights increases the wealth level of the effective median voter.23
22Or, at least relative to those countries with higher political rights. Our formal definition cares only about relative
differences.
23We will also assume the following regularity conditions:
(1) fW and e(·, r) are continuous in w and > 0 on [0, w].
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Proof. Fix some level of rights r and suppose r′ < r. The effective median voter at the two rights levels, say
mr and m′r, are given by 10, specifically
mr ≡
∫ mr
0
e(w, r)fw(w)dw =
1
2
mr′ ≡
∫ mr′
0
e(w, r′)fw(w)dw =
1
2
and we intend to show that mr′ > mr. Define h(w) by
h(w) ≡ e(w, r
′)
e(w, r)
and since each e is continuous in w and and > 0 on [0, w], so is h. From 2, h is also strictly increasing in w.
Now define
g(z) ≡
∫ z
0
e(w, r)fW (w)dw −
∫ z
0
e(w, r′)fW (w)dw
=
∫ z
0
e(w, r)fW (w)dw −
∫ z
0
h(w)e(w, r)fW (w)dw
=
∫ z
0
e(w, r)fW (w)[1− h(w)]dw(11)
Clearly g is continuous and it follows from 1 that
(12) g(0) = g(1) = 0
Examining 11, since h < 1 implies g(1) > 0 and h > 1 implies g(1) < 0 there exist w1, w2 with
h(w1) > 1 > h(w2)
so by continuity of h there exists a w∗ s.t. h(w∗) = 1. Since in addition h is strictly increasing, this w∗ is
unique and again examination of 11 shows that
g(z) is strictly increasing on [0, w∗]
g(z) is strictly decreasing on [w∗, w]
Together with 12, this implies that g > 0 on (0, w). Now in particular, we have
g(mr) =
∫ mr
0
e(w, r)fW (w)dw −
∫ mr
0
e(w, r′)fW (w)dw
=
1
2
−
∫ mr
0
e(w, r′)fW (w)dw
> 0
so that ∫ mr
0
e(w, r′)fW (w)dw <
1
2
which implies mr′ > mr as desired. 
Appendix B
World Bank Categorization. After splitting the sample into low-income and high-income countries, we
check for the correlation between trade restrictiveness and inequality. Inequality is positively correlated with
trade restrictiveness in high-income countries and negatively correlated in low-income countries.
Table 10. Correlation between TRI and Gini Index (1988-2002)
Countries Correlation coefficient Number of Observations
High-Income 0.31 26
Low-Income -0.21 51
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Trade Restrictiveness Index. The TRI is defined as the uniform tariff that would maintain imports of
the country at the same level as the existing tariff structure i.e.,
TRIc|
∑
n
mc,n(TRIc) =
∑
n
mc,n(tc,n) = m0c
where, mc,n is the import of good n by country c, m0c is its existing import bundle and tc,n is its current
protection level (tariffs, duties, tariff equivalents of NTBs) for each import good n. It captures the trade
“distortions imposed by each country’s trade policies on its import bundle”. (Kee et al, 2006). If we totally
differentiate the above equation, we get that
TRIc =
∑
n
(
dmc,n
dpc,n
)
tc,n∑
n
(
dmc,n
dpc,n
)
where pc,n is the price of good n in country c. So, TRIc is a weighted average of trade restrictions in country
c.
Additional Empirical Results. This part contains results that correspond to regressions reported in the
main body of the paper. All regressions in this appendix have been estimated using OLS.
DM Results. Tables 11, 12 and 13 compare our results with those of DM’s. They reveal the sensitivity of
the DM results to exclusion of outliers in the dataset.
Table 11. Dependent Variable: Tariff - Using Easterly-Levine’s (K/L) ratios
a) DM b) W/o outliers c) DM d) W/o outliers
Gini -0.151† 0.005 Q3 0.295** 0.166
(0.10) (0.04) (0.13) (0.14)
Gini * (K/L) 0.015† 0.0003 Q3 * (K/L) -0.032** -0.02
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
(K/L) -0.961** -0.037 (K/L) 0.349* 0.296
(0.39) (0.19) (0.19) (0.23)
Schooling 0.036† 0.005 Schooling 0.002 -0.005
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Pol. Rights -0.002 0.002 Pol. Rights -0.031 0.001
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
SS Africa -0.334† 0.189* SS Africa -0.013 0.08
(0.20) (0.10) (0.18) (0.08)
East Asia -0.249† 0.069 East Asia -0.009 0.111*
(0.15) (0.07) (0.18) (0.06)
Oil 0.224† 0.134** Oil -0.031 -0.004
(0.15) (0.06) (0.23) (0.08)
Constant 9.579** 0.121 Constant -2.907+ -2.326
(3.71) (1.86) (1.81) (2.25)
N 28 27 N 30 28
R2 0.7 0.66 R2 0.44 0.7
(K/L)* 10.18 (K/L)* 9.2
# of obs. excluded 1 (m/s) 2 (IND, m/s) # of obs. excluded 1 (m/s) 2 (IND, SLE, m/s)
Studentized Res. 14 14
Compare w/DM Similar Different Compare w/DM Similar Different
* Notes: IND = India, SLE = Sierra Leone, m/s = missing, SS = Sub-Saharan. In this case, there is
a missing country in our dataset. Despite the missing observation, we are able to get very close to DM’s
results for these regressions. Absolute DFbeta values for Sierra Leone range from 1.9-2.1.
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Table 12. Dependent Variable: Import Duty - Using Summer-Heston’s (K/L) ratios
a ) DM b) W/o outliers c) DM d) W/o outliers
Gini -6.268*** 2.2 Q3 10.703*** 0.36
(1.88) (6.55) (3.02) (11.6)
Gini * (K/L) 0.666*** -0.136 Q3 * (K/L) -1.226*** -0.41
(0.20) (0.67) (0.33) (1.04)
(K/L) -37.33*** 5.37 (K/L) 12.763*** 4.99
(8.44) (28.78) (4.41) (9.09)
Schooling 1.291* 0.571 Schooling -0.434 0.359
(0.75) (0.787) (0.74) (1.33)
Pol. Rights 0.288 -0.785 Pol. Rights -2.561*** -3.97**
(1.18) (1.46) (0.96) (1.77)
SS Africa -5.59 SS Africa 3.981* 11.21
(6.20) (4.00) (10)
East Asia -6.68 3.02 East Asia -0.85 7.09
(4.96) (6.61) (4.60) (8.81)
Oil 10.034** 8.43 Oil -2.215 -4.45
(4.45) (6.7) (6.13) (5.5)
Constant 354.976*** -83.34 Constant -88.082* 19.023
(78.97) (285.21) (41.30) (113.26)
N 31 28 N 35 29
R2 0.73 0.5 R2 0.66 0.43
(K/L)* 9.4 (K/L)* 8.7
Studentized Res. 4.5 5
Endogeneity F -st. 2.47* Endogeneity F -st. 5.63***
Compare w/DM Same Different Compare w/DM Same Different
*Note: India is excluded from these two regressions. Other countries have been excluded due to lack of
data availability on instrumental variables.
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Table 13. Dependent Variable: Import Duty - Using Easterly-Levine’s (K/L) ratios
a) DM b) W/o outliers c) DM d) W/o outliers
Gini -6.462** -2.043 Q3 9.844*** 2.803
(2.46) (2.00) (3.42) (2.49)
Gini * (K/L) 0.675** 0.256 Q3 * (K/L) -1.14*** -0.471*
(0.26) (0.21) (0.36) (0.26)
(K/L) -37.524*** -12.614 (K/L) 11.502** 6.36*
(10.51) (9.29) (5.15) (3.40)
Schooling 1.249† 0.466 Schooling -0.399 -0.419
(0.77) (0.57) (0.81) (0.52)
Pol. Rights 0.396 0.387 Pol. Rights -2.265** -1.038†
(1.22) (0.87) (1.03) (0.69)
SS Africa -4.894 7.488 SS Africa 2.235 5.836*
(6.38) (5.29) (5.00) (3.24)
East Asia -6 1.533 East Asia -0.107 3.837
(5.24) (4.07) (5.04) (3.28)
Oil 10.526** 8.675 Oil -2.011 -0.715
(4.74) (3.38) (6.41) (4.08)
Constant 361.69*** 108.459 Constant -75.818† -22.072
(100.47) (90.88) (48.77) (32.39)
N 28 27 N 31 30
R2 0.75 0.76 R2 0.67 0.77
(K/L)* 9.6 (K/L)* 8.6
# of obs. excluded 0 1 (IND) # of obs. excluded 0 1 (IND)
Studentized Residual 5.4 5.8
Compare w/DM Same Different Compare w/DM Similar Different
Table 14 reports results for the reduced regression using import duties in the 1980s. The test for joint
significance of key variables does not support the Mayer hypothesis.
Table 14. Dependent Variable: Import Duty
a) b) Pol. Rights < 5 c) d) Pol. Rights < 5
Gini -0.573 -1.905 Q3 1.8 -1.308
(0.73) (1.65) (2.07) (3.26)
Gini * (K/L) 0.077 0.204 Q3 * (K/L) -0.242 0.077
(0.08) (0.16) (0.22) (0.33)
(K/L) -7.572** -13.193* (K/L) 0.802 -6.247
(3.07) (6.89) (3.25) (5.07)
Constant 76.366** 136.019* Constant 9.335 78.908†
(29.89) (71.13) (30.35) (49.02)
N 42 31 N 56 33
R2 0.65 0.7 R2 0.46 0.77
F-statistic for joint test 1.94 1.83 F-statistic for joint test 1.75 1.56
(Gini and Gini*(K/L)) (Q3 and Q3*(K/L))
Since multicollinearity is still a problem in the reduced regressions of Tables 2 and 14, we drop capital-
labor ratios from the right hand side of the regression equation to check the results. Tables 15 and 16 contain
these results for tariffs and import duties respectively.
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Table 15. Dependent Variable: Tariff
a) b) Pol. Rights < 5 c) d) Pol. Rights < 5
Gini 0.018*** 0.027*** Q3 0.019† 0.055***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Gini * (K/L) -0.002*** -0.003*** Q3 * (K/L) -0.003*** -0.006***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.035 0.054 Constant 0.35*** 0.179**
(0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08)
N 42 30 N 47 32
R2 0.49 0.7 R2 0.44 0.73
(K/L)* 11.38 10.8 (K/L)* 5.8 9.5
Table 16. Dependent Variable: Import Duty
a) b) Pol. Rights < 5 c) d) Pol. Rights < 5
Gini 1.178*** 1.231*** Q3 1.306*** 2.601***
(0.16) (0.20) (0.51) (0.76)
Gini * (K/L) -0.107*** -0.104*** Q3 * (K/L) -0.189*** -0.325***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Constant 3.182 0.033 Constant 16.74*** 18.76***
(4.13) (4.60) (4.56) (4.60)
N 42 31 N 56 33
R2 0.6 0.65 R2 0.46 0.76
(K/L)* 11.1 11.8 (K/L)* 6.9 8
When we exclude capital-labor ratios as an explanatory variable in the reduced regression, we get in-
dividually significant terms with a positive coefficient on the gini and Q3 terms and a negative coefficient
on the interaction terms in each case. This implies that if gini index is taken as a measure of inequality,
then the Mayer implication can be rejected, since our results imply that trade restrictiveness and inequality
are positively correlated in countries with low capital ownership and negatively correlated in countries with
high capital ownership. On the other hand, if Q3 is considered to be a better measure of inequality, then
our results appear to validate the Mayer implication. But, there is a caveat here. The correlation between
the interaction term Q3*(K/L) and (K/L) is 0.83 (as opposed to -0.3 for gini*(K/L) and (K/L)), so it may
simply be working as a proxy for K/L in this regression. We have no reason to believe that data on Q3 is
better than that on gini indices. Further, our subsequent regressions for the 1980s and 1990s validate the
Mayer implication using both measures of inequality.
Endogeneity. We report the results for endogeneity tests in the tables below.
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Table 17. Results for Endogeneity Tests
Table Number N F-statistic
2 (a) 30 0.4
2 (c) 33 1.35
3 (a) 34 1.25
3 (c) 33 1.65
4 (a) 34 0.49
4 (c) 38 1.73
5 (a) 35 1.12
5 (c) 30 1.32
6 (a) 35 0.87
6 (c) 30 1.35
9 (b) 34 0.34
14 (a) 32 1.59
14 (c) 37 1.5
19 (a) 34 0.6
19 (c) 31 0.39
19 (e) 31 0.49
In 19 (c) and 19 (e), we use instruments for the median voter terms as well since these are multiplies with
elasticities too.
Robustness check: Cohen-Soto Index. The Mayer hypothesis is validated. The gini coefficient is negative
and significant, while the interaction term is positive and significant. (Note: The Cohen-Soto index ranges
from 0 to 15, while the Baier et al index ranges from 0 to 7).
Table 18. Dependent Variable: Trade Restrictiveness Index - Using Cohen-Soto HKI
a) b) Pol. Rights < 5 c) d) Pol. Rights < 5
Gini -0.007** -0.008** Q3 0.044** Too few obs.
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Gini * HKI 0.001** 0.001*** Q3 * HKI -0.005**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
HKI -0.048*** -0.052*** HKI 0.062**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Constant 0.568*** 0.568*** Constant -0.409
(0.17) (0.18) (0.30)
N 51 38 N 30
R2 0.16 0.25 R2 0.33
(HKI)* 7.85 7.51 (HKI)* 9.35
Robustness Check: Level Prediction. The results for log of import shares are presented in columns (a) and
(b) of Table 19 while the results from specification 9 are presented in columns (c) and (d). All qualitative
results are similar when population is used as an instrument.
Note: vm implies value of imports.
All key coefficients are significant and have the expected signs. The IV estimates are similar to OLS
estimates due to rejection of endogeneity/measurement error in each regression.
Oil Exporting Countries. Qualitative results do not change when a dummy variable is used for oil-exporting
countries, as in DM.
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Table 19. Dependent Variable: Trade Restrictiveness Index
ToT : Log(vm · e) ToT : Log(m · e∗) ToT : Log(vm · e∗)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
MV -16.87*** -16.85*** MV(b1+B1) -17.24*** -17.29*** -18.12*** -18.13***
(3.48) (3.19) (3.57) (3.32) (3.74) (3.45)
MV *HKI 11.95*** 11.93*** MV(b1+B1)*HKI 11.86*** 11.97*** 12.69*** 12.71***
(2.52) (2.37) (2.42) (2.33) (2.61) (2.5)
HKI -0.336*** -0.335*** HKI -0.314*** -0.32*** -0.337*** -0.34***
(0.088) (0.081) (0.081) (0.078) (0.088) (0.083)
ToT 0.018* 0.018* ToT 0.016** 0.019* 0.018** 0.018*
(0.009) (0.01) (0.008) (0.01) (0.009) (0.01)
WTO -0.077*** -0.077*** WTO -0.075*** -0.079*** -0.077*** -0.078***
(0.02) (0.013) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.02)
Constant 0.42*** 0.43*** Constant 0.23 0.16*** 0.35*** 0.34***
(0.158) (0.163) (0.23) (0.287) (0.18) (0.2)
N 34 34 N 34 34 34 34
R2 0.42 0.42 R2 0.41 0.4 0.41 0.41
HKI* 1.41 1.41 HKI* 1.44 1.44 1.43 1.43
Table 20. Dependent Variable: Tariff
a) b) c) d)
Gini -0.008 Q3 0.01 Gini -0.028** Q3 0.064*
(0.021) (0.063) (0.012) (0.04)
Gini * (K/L) 0.001 Q3 * (K/L) -0.003 Gini * HKI 0.02** Q3 * HKI -0.051**
(0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.027)
(K/L) -0.105 (K/L) -0.009 HKI -1.038*** HKI 0.575
(0.08) (0.104) (0.319) (0.424)
Oil 0.084** Oil 0.023 Oil 0.038 Oil -0.007
(0.041) (0.047) (0.041) (0.048)
Constant 1.057 Constant 0.469 Constant 1.666*** Constant -0.497
(0.805) (0.99) (0.5) (0.607)
N 49 N 53 N 49 N 53
R2 0.51 R2 0.42 R2 0.51 R2 0.39
(K/L)* (K/L)* (HKI)* 1.4 (HKI)* 1.26
Table 21. Dependent Variable: Import Duty
a) b) c) d)
Gini -0.944 Q3 2.356 Gini -1.543** Q3 3.964*
(1.194) (2.183) (0.694) (2.095)
Gini * (K/L) 0.129 Q3 * (K/L) -0.293 Gini * HKI 1.203* Q3 * HKI -2.981**
(0.124) (0.23) (0.471) (1.451)
(K/L) -7.873* (K/L) 1.466 HKI -60.23*** HKI 33.254†
(4.72) (3.435) (18.234) (22.17)
Oil 2.363 Oil 4.019 Oil 0.372 Oil 2.942
(2.414) (2.785) (2.342) (3.024)
Constant 73.601† Constant 2.128 Constant 90.693*** Constant -31.834
(46.241) (32.05) (27.807) (31.03)
N 48 N 61 N 48 N 61
R2 0.5 R2 0.45 R2 0.53 R2 0.35
(K/L)* (K/L)* (HKI)* 1.3 (HKI)* 1.3
